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Abstract
Many tax-codes around the world allow for special taxable treatment of savings in
retirement accounts. In particular, proﬁts in retirement accounts are usually tax exempt
which allow investors to increase an asset’s return by holding it in such a retirement ac-
count. While the existing literature on asset location shows that risk-free bonds are usually
the preferred asset to hold in a retirement account, we explain how the tax exemption of
proﬁts in retirement accounts aﬀects private investors’ asset allocation. We show that to-
tal ﬁnal wealth can be decomposed into what the investor would have earned in a taxable
account and what is due to the tax exemption of proﬁts in the retirement account. The
tax exemption of proﬁts can thus be considered a tax-gift which is similar to an implicit
bond holding. As this tax-gift’s impact on total ﬁnal wealth decreases over time, so does
the investor’s equity exposure.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: G11, H24
Key Words: asset location, asset allocation, tax-deferred accounts, tax exempt accounts1 Introduction
Proﬁts from dividends, interest and capital gains are usually subject to taxation. In tax-
sheltered retirement accounts, however, proﬁts remain untaxed which allows the return of an
asset to increase from its after-tax to its pre-tax return by holding it in such a tax-sheltered
retirement account. This paper explains optimal asset allocation (i.e. which assets to hold) and
asset location (i.e. in which account to hold these assets) for investors having the opportunity
to invest in both taxable and retirement accounts. In particular, it explains why the equity
exposure in both taxable as well as retirement wealth decreases with a decreasing investment
horizon. It is most closely related to the recent literature on optimal asset location decisions
including Shoven and Sialm (1998), Shoven and Sialm (2003), Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang
(2004), Poterba, Shoven, and Sialm (2004), Huang (2006) and Garlappi and Huang (2006).
These papers conclude that assets facing a high tax-burden should generally be located in
retirement accounts, while assets facing a low tax-burden are better located in conventional
taxable accounts. Garlappi and Huang (2006), however, show that this ﬁnding does not hold
in general.
While, in general, the existing literature shows that risk-free bonds are the preferred asset
to hold in the retirement account, we explain how the investor’s equity exposure in both the
taxable and the retirement account depends on the length of the remaining investment horizon
and the fraction of total wealth in the retirement account. Due to the tax exemption of proﬁts in
the retirement account, total wealth contains a tax-gift which becomes bigger as the remaining
investment horizon increases. As bonds are usually the preferred asset to hold in a retirement
account the tax-gift can be considered an implicit bond holding that is not directly observable in
security accounts. As this tax-gift decreases with decreasing length of the remaining investment
horizon, so does the unobservable bond holding and the observable equity exposure.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 introduces
the model and discusses the tax-eﬀects of investments into tax-sheltered retirement accounts.
Section 4 provides numerical evidence. Section 5 provides a conclusion.
2 Prior Studies
Dilnot (1995) categorizes retirement accounts according to the taxable treatment of contri-
butions, proﬁts and withdrawals. Even though theoretically, there are many combinations of
taxable treatments, in practice there are only three main types of retirement accounts to be
1found. The so-called taxable accounts (TAs) are accounts in which contributions can only be
made from after-income-tax dollars, and where proﬁts are taxable and withdrawals are tax
exempt. Tax-deferred accounts (TDAs) such as IRAs are characterized by the opportunity to
contribute to them from pre-income-tax dollars, and withdrawals are taxable while proﬁts are
tax exempt. In tax exempt accounts (TEAs) like Roth-IRAs, contributions are made from after
income tax dollars, proﬁts are tax exempt, and withdrawals are tax-exempt. In many coun-
tries, diﬀerent kinds of accounts coexist with diﬀerent taxable treatment. Whereas TAs can be
used for other investment objectives besides saving for retirement, TEAs and TDAs are pure
retirement accounts. Early withdrawals from them are subject to a penalty tax and contribu-
tions to them are limited by law. As TAs can be used as saving accounts for other investment
objectives as well, only TEAs and TDAs are referred to as retirement accounts (RAs) in this
article. Due to the diﬀering taxable treatment of the funds in the various accounts, investing
a pre-tax dollar in each of the separate types of accounts usually results in varying risk-return
proﬁles of that dollar and diﬀerent changes in wealth.
Although optimal asset allocation is a topic that has been intensively discussed in economic
literature, research on optimal asset location is quite a recent ﬁeld of research. It goes back to
studies of Tepper and Aﬄeck (1974), Black (1980) and Tepper (1981). They analyze optimal
investment strategies of companies that run deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans. If these companies
do not face any short-selling restrictions and their gains are fully taxable at the moment of
occurrence (i.e. there is no deferral option), they should hold bonds only in their deﬁned-
beneﬁt pension plan, where the taxable treatment is similar to that of TEAs. Auerbach and
King (1983) point out that this result also applies to investors having the opportunity to invest
into a retirement account and a TA.
Shoven and Sialm (1998) and Shoven (1999) introduce the problem of asset location to
household investment decisions and point out that each choice of an investment strategy for
retirement saving does not only contain a choice about the assets to invest in (the so-called
asset allocation problem), but also a choice about which of these assets to locate in a retirement
account and which to locate in a taxable account (the so-called asset location problem). In their
studies, they analyze asset location and asset allocation decisions for simulated distributions of
wealth. They arrive at the conclusion that due to tax-ineﬃciency of many actively managed
mutual funds, these funds have their preferred location in a retirement account, while tax
exempt bonds should be held in a taxable account.
Bodie and Crane (1997), Poterba and Samwick (2001) and Barber and Odean (2003) analyze
asset location strategies used by private investors in practice. They report that investors do not
2realize the opportunities that TDAs oﬀer to them. In particular, they often choose suboptimal
asset location strategies. Contribution rates have been found to have an especially substantial
impact on utility losses (Gomes, Michaelides, and Polkovnichenko (2006)). Amromin (2002)
and Bergstresser and Poterba (2004) report similar ﬁndings and further point out that many
investors have considerable amounts of money in both accounts and hold signiﬁcantly more
stocks in their TDAs than in their TAs. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) point out that investors
tend to follow naive 1
n-diversiﬁcation strategies in their retirement accounts and pension plans
and thus the more stock funds oﬀered to them by these plans the more stocks investors tend
to hold.
According to Gale and Scholz (1994), the majority of investors in the US that contribute to
an individual retirement account are either older than 59 or have substantial funds in a TA in
addition to the funds in the IRA. Either of these cases makes the need for an early withdrawal
- which is accompanied by a penalty tax - quite unlikely. This is why we put the focus of
our analysis on the asset location and asset allocation decisions induced by the tax-eﬀects and
ignore early withdrawals.
A dollar invested into a risk-free asset in an RA results in a higher after-tax yield than a
dollar invested into the same risk-free asset in a TA. Hence, the dollar in the RA is worth more
than the dollar in the TA, a fact which has been pointed out by Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang
(2004) and Poterba (2004). Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004) call the diﬀerence between the
value of the dollar in the TEA and the value of the dollar in the TA the ”shadow price” of that
dollar. This ”shadow price” depends on the relative dividend of the assets, the relative capital
gains of the assets, the level of tax-rates on these dividends and gains, and the length of the
remaining investment horizon. Due to the penalty tax for early withdrawal and the maximum
contribution limits for TEAs and TDAs, TAs are often used for retirement saving as well.
Hence, private investors saving for retirement usually only locate some part of their retirement
savings in a retirement account. Due to the diﬀerence in taxable treatment of assets between a
taxable account and a retirement account, it is important to make an informed decision as to
which asset to locate in the retirement account and which to locate in the taxable account.
In many countries, capital gains and proﬁts from interest and dividends are subject to
diﬀerent taxable treatment. Proﬁts from capital gains are usually not taxed when they occur,
but rather when these capital gains are realized by selling the corresponding assets. This special
treatment of capital gains allows investors to follow tax-timing strategies like those described in
Constantinides (1983) and Constantinides (1984). His results are derived in a model in which
investors only have access to a TA, but they can be applied in a two-account setting as well.
3According to these tax-timing strategies one should realize losses immediately in order to let
the treasury participate in them and defer realizing gains as long as possible in order to earn
the compound interest. Furthermore, if short-term capital gains are taxed at a higher tax-rate
than long-term capital gains, it can be optimal to realize long-term gains and repurchase the
assets to regain the opportunity of realizing short-term losses in these assets (Constantinides
(1984)). The advantages of tax-timing are accompanied by the risk of not selling assets for
ﬁscal reasons and thereby ending up with a portfolio that is not well diversiﬁed. Tax-timing
is not a problem that develops from the asset location problem itself, but from the taxation of
assets in a taxable account. Thus, for simplicity, it is assumed that capital gains are taxable at
the moment of occurrence and cannot be deferred until realization. An equivalent assumption
is to consider the tax-rates as the eﬀective tax-rates, as described in Constantinides (1983),
which reﬂect the unmodeled optimal tax realization strategy in the risky asset.
The impact of tax-timing strategies on optimal asset location decisions with diversiﬁcation
concerns is analyzed in Zaman (2005). In his numerical study, stocks tend to have their preferred
location in the taxable account to use potential beneﬁts from tax-timing and exploit the higher
tax-burden of bonds. This result does not diﬀer from that in Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang
(2004), whose analysis contains only one risky asset.
Furthermore, (long-term) capital gains are often subject to a lower tax-rate than dividends
and interest. This is why the returns on stocks that mainly consist of capital gains tend to be
taxed at a lower rate than the returns on bonds mainly consisting of interest payments. For
this reason, Shoven and Sialm (2003) argue that bonds should have their preferred location in
a retirement account and stocks shall only be held there if no bonds are held in the taxable
account at all. This argument seems to be very convincing at ﬁrst sight and has been shown
to be correct for investors that are not facing short-selling restrictions (see e.g. Dammon,
Spatt, and Zhang (2004), Shoven and Sialm (2003) or the theoretical paper of Huang (2006)).
However, Garlappi and Huang (2006) show that this does not necessarily hold if the investor
is short-selling constrained.
If investors are facing high labor income risk and have limited liquid ﬁnancial resources, some
papers, among them Amromin (2003), Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004) and Amromin (2005),
argue that holding stocks in the retirement account and bonds in the taxable account can also
be an eﬃcient investment strategy when taking labor income shocks into account. They base
their argument on the fact that due to the lower volatility of bonds, holding them in the taxable
account reduces the probability of having to withdraw funds from the retirement account and
to pay the penalty tax. The higher the probability and the order of magnitude of income
4shocks and the lower the liquid ﬁnancial resources, the better the strategy to hold suﬃcient
TA-wealth in bonds. Besides, under current law there seem to be tax arbitrage opportunities
between savings in retirement accounts and mortgage payments (Amromin, Huang, and Sialm
(2006)). The literature on taxation and optimal portfolio choice is surveyed in Poterba (2002).
Campbell (2006) provides an overview of the complexity of other households’ ﬁnancial decisions
and their participation in ﬁnancial markets.
While the focus of the existing literature is on the asset location decision, we concentrate on
the impact of the tax-eﬀects in retirement accounts for the investor’s asset allocation decision.
3 Tax-Eﬀects in Retirement Accounts
3.1 Eﬀects of Tax Deferral
in this article it is assumed that dividends, interest, and capital gains in the TA are taxable
at occurrence. That is, no matter if realized or not, capital gains are fully taxable, i.e. there
is no tax-timing option. Equivalently one could also assume the corresponding tax-rate to be
the ”eﬀective tax-rate” as described in Constantinides (1983), which reﬂects the unmodeled
optimal tax realization strategy in the risky asset. It is further assumed that the investor
cannot go short and there is no need for an early withdrawal from a retirement account. This
in particular implies that the investor does not have to pay the penalty tax for early withdrawal
at any point in time. A market with n assets is considered. Assets can be traded without
incurring any transaction costs. Let αl,i,k denote the proportion of asset i in period k with
location l ∈ {R,T}, in which R denotes the location in a retirement account (TDA or TEA)
and T denotes a location in the taxable account. Let αl,k := (αl,1,k,...,αl,n,k)> be the vector of
proportions of the n assets in period k with location l. 0 ≤ τd < 1 denotes the constant tax-rate
on dividends and interest, and 0 ≤ τg < 1 the constant tax-rate on capital gains. In particular,
it is assumed that short-term and long-term capital gains are subject to the same tax-rate.
0 ≤ dR,i,k and −1 ≤ gR,i,k are the dividend or interest rate (dividend rate in this article) and
the capital gains rate, respectively, for asset i in period k in the retirement account (and thus
on a pre-tax basis). dT,i,k := (1 − τd)dR,i,k and gT,i,k := (1 − τg)gR,i,k denote the dividend rate
and the capital gains rate of asset i in period k in the TA (and thus on an after-tax basis).
dl,k := (dl,1,k,...,dl,n,k)> denotes the vector of dividend rates in period k with location l and
gl,k := (gl,1,k,...,gl,n,k)> denotes the vector of capital gains rates in period k with location l.
0 ≤ τp,k < 1 denotes an exogenously given personal income tax-rate of the investor in period
5k. 1 denotes a column vector of n ones. The vector of gross returns Rl,k in period k for assets
with location l is given by Rl,k := 1 + dl,k + gl,k. WT,k denotes the wealth of some investor in
a TA after payment of taxes on capital gains, interest, and dividends, and WR,k the wealth of
that investor in a RA at the end of period k.
Tax-deferred accounts allow deferring income taxation until withdrawal. That means con-
tributions to such tax-deferred accounts are made from pretax-income. This is in contrast to
taxable accounts and tax exempt accounts, where contributions can only be made from after-
tax dollars. Investors facing a high marginal income tax rate at the time of contribution, but
expecting a lower personal income tax-rate at the time of withdrawal can lower their expected
relative income tax burden by an investment in a TDA.
Assume the investor is initially endowed with WT,0 dollars in a TA and WR,0 dollars in a
TEA. For simplicity, he is not allowed to shift funds between the two accounts and maximizes
utility over a t-period investment horizon from total ﬁnal wealth Wt := WT,t + WR,t.
The investment decision of the investor can be decomposed into two parts. On the one hand,
the investor has to decide which assets to hold. This problem is known as the asset allocation
problem. On the other hand, he has to decide which of the assets to hold in the retirement
account and which in the taxable account. This problem is known as the asset location problem.
In the remainder of this paper an asset allocation for a t-period investment horizon is deﬁned to
be a tuple (α1,...,αt) of vectors αk (k ∈ Nt := {n ∈ N|n ≤ t}), which contain the proportions
of the assets relative to total wealth Wk. An asset location for a t-period investment horizon
with investment opportunities in a retirement account and a TA is a tuple (L1,...,Lt) of tuples
Lk = (αR,k,αT,k) (k ∈ Nt), such that αk =
WT,k−1
Wk−1 αT,k +
WR,k−1
Wk−1 αR,k (k ∈ Nt). When returns
are stochastic, WT,k−1, WR,k−1, and Wk−1 are not known before the end of period k − 1, which
is why αT,k,αR,k, and αk also cannot be determined before the end of period k − 1, that is
at the beginning of period k. The tuple (I1,...,It) of tuples Ik = (αk,αR,k,αT,k) (k ∈ Nt)
is called an investment strategy. While the asset allocation (α1,...,αt) provides information
about proportions of the asset relative to total wealth, the asset location (L1,...,Lt) provides
information about the accounts in which these assets are held and with which proportions.
If one pre-income-tax dollar at the end of period 0 is invested in a TDA for a t-period
investment horizon and x·y denotes the Euclidian scalar product of two n-dimensional vectors
x and y, total ﬁnal wealth after income tax is given by
t Y
i=1

αR,i · (1 + gR,i + dR,i)

(1 − τp,t) =
t Y
i=1
(αR,i · RT,i)(1 − τp,t). (1)
6If one invests one such dollar for a t-period investment horizon in a TEA, income taxation is
already due at the time of contribution and one ends up with a ﬁnal wealth after income tax of
(1 − τp,0)
t Y
i=1

αR,i · (1 + gR,i + dR,i)

= (1 − τp,0)
t Y
i=1
(αR,i · RT,i). (2)
The only diﬀerence in total ﬁnal after income tax wealth of an investment in a TDA and a TEA
is the point of time at which the investor has to pay the income tax. As τp,0 might diﬀer from
τp,t, an investment in a TDA might result in diﬀerent ﬁnal wealth than an investment in a TEA.
An investment in a TDA oﬀers the opportunity to face an income tax-rate at withdrawal τp,t
that is lower than the income tax-rate at contribution τp,0, but bears the risk that τp,t is higher
than τp,0. If contributions to a TEA are made from income that has already been subject to
income taxation, the factor 1 − τp,0 is to be omitted.
If one invests one pre-income-tax dollar in a TA for a t-period investment horizon, total
ﬁnal after income tax wealth is given by
(1 − τp,0)
t Y
i=1

αT,i ·
 
1 + (1 − τg)gR,i + (1 − τd)dR,i

= (1 − τp,0)
t Y
i=1
(αT,i · RT,i). (3)
Total ﬁnal wealth after income tax of an investment in a TA and a TEA with the same propor-
tions of the assets αR,i = αT,i ∀i ∈ Nt only diﬀers in the rates of return. In the TA, dividend
rates and capital gains rates shrink towards zero by the factor 1 − τd and 1 − τg, respectively.
If one invests in assets whose dividend rates and capital gains rates cannot become negative,
an investment in a TEA is at least as good as an investment into a TA. If τp,0 ≥ τp,t, this also
holds for a comparison between an investment in a TA and a TDA. If however τp,t > τp,0, an
investment in a TA does not necessarily dominate an investment in a TDA, because for invest-
ment horizons of suﬃcient length, the tax exemption of proﬁts in the TDA can outweigh the
eﬀect of the higher income tax-rate.
3.2 Eﬀects of Tax Exemption of Proﬁts in Retirement Accounts
Saving for retirement is usually a process lasting several decades, where the eﬀect of tax exemp-
tion on proﬁts in TDAs and TEAs becomes of increasing importance due to the compounding
of interest and the length of the investment horizon. When combined with the eﬀect of shrink-
ing returns on total ﬁnal wealth, the tax exemption of proﬁts in retirement accounts can be
considered a public contribution to private retirement saving. This contribution does not come
7directly in the form of a payment to the retirement account, but indirectly as what can be
called a tax-gift. For an investor who can invest in a TA and a TEA total ﬁnal wealth is given
by
Wt = WT,0
t Y
k=1
(αT,k · RT,k) + WR,0
t Y
k=1
(αR,k · RR,k). (4)
For positive returns and αT,k = αR,k (k ∈ Nt), growth of wealth in the TEA is higher than
in the TA due to the tax exemption of proﬁts. Thus, the longer the investment horizon the
stronger the impact of wealth in the TEA on total ﬁnal wealth. The tax advantage that results
from the tax exemption of proﬁts in the TEA in period k is given by
Tk := αR,k · (RR,k − RT,k) = αR,k · (τddR,k + τggR,k). (5)
Tk can be interpreted as a relative tax-gift in period k that is paid for each dollar invested into
a TEA. Besides the vector of pre-tax and after-tax returns on the assets and the tax-rates on
gains and dividends, the relative tax-gift depends in particular on the choice of the proportions
of the assets αR,k in the TEA in period k. Equation (4) can be rewritten as
Wt =(WT,0 + WR,0)
t Y
k=1
(αk · RT,k) +
t X
k=1
WR,0
k−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tk
t Y
j=k+1
(αj · RT,j). (6)
Total ﬁnal wealth after income tax Wt at the end of period t, thus consists of two components.
The ﬁrst summmand is total ﬁnal wealth an investor would have attained without having
had the opportunity to invest in a TEA and is thus driven to invest his entire initial wealth
WT,0 + WR,0 in a TA. The second
Gt :=
t X
k=1
WR,0
k−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tk
t Y
j=k+1
(αj · RT,j) (7)
is the amount of total ﬁnal wealth Wt that results from the tax exemption of proﬁts as well
as interest and compound interest on the proﬁts in the TEA. It can be interpreted as a public
tax-gift for private retirement saving in terms of non-levied taxes on gains and dividends as
well as interest and compound interest and will be referred to as total tax-gift.
Especially for long investment horizons this tax-gift can be a substantial fraction of the
investor’s total ﬁnal wealth. To demonstrate the power of this tax-gift consider an investor
who is initially endowed with $ 5,000 in both his taxable and his retirement account and can
8only invest into one risk-free asset with a pre-tax return of 6%. If the investor’s investment
horizon is 40 years and the tax-rate applicable to the return of the asset is 36%, i.e. his after-tax
return is 3.84%, his total ﬁnal wealth is $ 74,000 and his tax-gift is $ 28,857, which is about
39% of his total ﬁnal wealth. The tax-gift thus has a tremendous impact on total ﬁnal wealth.
Equation (7) can be further decomposed into
Gt =
t X
i=1
i6=k
WR,0
i−1 Y
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)Ti
t Y
j=i+1
(αj · RT,j) + WR,0
k−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tk
t Y
j=k+1
(αj · RT,j)
+
t X
i=k+1
WR,0
i−1 Y
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)(αR,k · RR,k − 1)Ti
t Y
j=i+1
(αj · RT,j).
(8)
According to Equation (8), the total tax-gift contained in total ﬁnal wealth Wt can be decom-
posed into three summands. The part of Gt that is independent from the investment decision in
period k and only depends on the tax-eﬀects of the other periods is given by the ﬁrst summand.
The absolute change in total ﬁnal wealth that results from the second summand
WR,0
k−1 Y
j=1
(αR,j · RR,j)Tk
t Y
j=k+1
(αj · RT,j) (9)
describes the change in total ﬁnal wealth that results from the relative tax-gift in period k and
is called the direct tax-eﬀect of the investment decision in period k, or just the direct tax-eﬀect
in this article. It depends on growth of TEA-wealth until the end of period k−1 and therefore
also on the proportions of the assets in the TEA αR,j (j ∈ Nk−1) until period k−1, the relative
tax-gift Tk, and the after-tax growth rate
Qt
j=k+1 (αj · RT,j) until the end of the investment
horizon. WR,0
Qk−1
j=1 (αR,j · RR,j)Tk describes the tax-gift in period k which then grows by the
after-tax growth rate
Qt
j=k+1 (αj · RT,j) until the end of the investment horizon. The absolute
change in total ﬁnal wealth that results from the third summand
t X
i=k+1
WR,0
i−1 Y
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)(αR,k · RR,k − 1)Ti
t Y
j=i+1
(αj · RT,j) (10)
is the change in total ﬁnal wealth that results from the change of period k retirement wealth
and is called the indirect tax-eﬀect of the investment decision in period k or just the indirect
tax-eﬀect in the preceding.
Each summand in (10) can be interpreted as follows: WR,0
Qk−1
j=1 (αR,j · RR,j) is TEA wealth
9at the end of period k − 1, (αR,k · RR,k − 1) is the relative change in TEA wealth that results
from the investment decision in the TEA in period k, and
Qi−1
j=k+1 (αR,j · RR,j) is the change in
TEA wealth from period k+1 to period i−1 which results from the investment decision in period
k. Ti is the relative tax-gift in period i. Hence WR,0
Qi−1
j=1
j6=k
(αR,j · RR,j)(αR,k · RR,k − 1)Ti is the
eﬀect on period i total wealth, which results from the choice of αR,k in period k and the increase
of the tax exempt basis in that period. It then grows with after-tax return
Qt
j=i+1 (αj · RT,j)
until the end of period t to the indirect tax-eﬀect.
The direct tax-eﬀect from Equation (9) has a singular eﬀect, as it only has an impact on
total wealth in one single period and then grows with an after income tax return until the end
of the investment horizon. The expression for the indirect tax-eﬀect in Equation (10), however,
has more than one summand for k ≤ t − 2. Due to the change in the tax exempt basis, it has
an impact on all future periods. This is why the impact on total ﬁnal wealth from the indirect
tax-eﬀect in period k can be quantiﬁed by the direct tax-eﬀects of all future periods on that
part of TEA wealth that results from the investment decision in period k.
Both the direct and the indirect tax-eﬀect are not necessarily an advantage to the investor.
If the total return on TEA-wealth in period k is negative, the relative tax-gift Tk can become
negative. This is because contrary to an investment in a TA, the treasury does not participate
in these losses via the taxation of dividends and gains. If Tk becomes negative, so does the
direct tax-eﬀect. As with the direct tax-eﬀect, negative gains that outweigh potential interest
or dividends can lead to a negative return on TEA wealth, which causes a relative reduction
in the tax exempt basis of forthcoming periods by (αR,k · RR,k − 1) < 0, and shows a negative
indirect tax-eﬀect.
3.3 Generalization to TDAs
The argument for the case of an investment opportunity set with a TEA and a TA can be
generalized to the case of an investment opportunity set with a TDA and a TA as follows:
Initial wealth WR,0 which has been invested into a TEA at the end of period 0 must have been
made from after income tax dollars. As an investment into a TDA is made from pre income-tax
dollars, instead of investing WR,0 after income tax dollars into a TEA, one can invest
WR,0
1−τp,0 pre
income-tax dollars in a TDA. As wealth in a TDA is still subject to income taxation at the
end of the investment horizon at rate τp,t, the investor can only consider W 0
R,k := WR,k
1−τp,t
1−τp,0 his
eﬀective wealth, as the remainder falls to the treasury at the end of period t. If τp,t < τp,0, then
W 0
R,k > WR,k and an investment in a TDA results in a higher ﬁnal wealth than an investment
10into a TEA due to the lower burdening with income tax. As W 0
R,k and WR,k only diﬀer by
the constant factor
1−τp,t
1−τp,0, the problem of ﬁnding the optimal investment strategy with an
investment opportunity set with both a TEA and a TA, is equivalent to the problem of with a
TDA and a TA. Hence, it suﬃces to consider an investor with the opportunity to invest into
both a TA and a retirement account. As before, WR,k denotes the wealth in the RA if the
retirement account is a TEA and the eﬀective wealth in the RA if the retirement account is a
TDA.
3.4 Optimal Asset Location Decisions
According to the seminal work of Huang (2006), investors that do not face short-selling con-
straints should invest their entire retirement-wealth into the asset a with the highest eﬀective
tax-rate
τa :=
(1 + (1 − τd)dB)(xa − 1)
(1 + (1 − τd)dB)xa − 1
(11)
in which xa := 1
1−τg +
da(τd−τg)−τg
(1−τg)(1+(1−τd)dB) is the replication cost in the TA of one dollar of asset
a in the RA. Furtermore, in this case, the asset location and asset allocation problem are
independent from each other, as each dollar in asset a in the RA can be replicated by 1
1−τg
dollars of that asset and
da(τd−τg)−τg
(1−τg)(1+(1−τd)dB) dollars of the risk-free asset in the TA. In particular,
in such a setting the asset allocation and asset location decision are independent from each
other.
If, however, the investor is not allowed to go short, it is no longer necessarily optimal for him
to hold the asset with the highest eﬀective tax-rate in the RA as shown in Garlappi and Huang
(2006). This is due to the fact that the investor cannot replicate the tax-deferred portfolio in
the taxable account if this required to go short. Garlappi and Huang (2006) have also pointed
out that holding stocks in the RA can help smooth the ratio of the relative tax-gift Tk times
WR,k−1 to total wealth Wk−1. They call this ratio the tax-subsidy. This tax-subsidy can be
interpreted as that part of growth in total wealth that results from the relative tax-gift in period
k. This growth in total wealth can be smoothed by constructing portfolios in the RA and the
TA that have similar weights in the two assets.
Smoothing these extra growth-rates results in less volatile distributions of ﬁnal wealth,
which is desirable for risk-averse investors. However, Garlappi and Huang (2006) assume the
return of the risky asset to be binomially distributed. In this case, it is possible to smooth
11the tax-subsidy in such a way that it takes the same value, independent from the realization
of the return from the risky asset. If, however, the return on the risky asset S has a more
complex distribution and can take more than two realizations, it is no longer possible to keep
the tax-subsidy at the same level independent from the realization of the return. Nevertheless,
in such a case, it is still possible to dampen the impact of the total tax-gift, which, according to
Equation (7), is ceteris paribus best attained when only holding bonds in the RA. As one can
see from Equation (6), in addition to the risks due to the volatility of growth of total wealth
after-tax, the volatility of the total tax-gift is a second source of risk to which total ﬁnal wealth
is exposed when holding stocks in a retirement account.
For a given asset allocation αi (i ∈ Nt\{k}), the decision to locate stocks instead of bonds in
the retirement account in period k has three eﬀects on the risk-return proﬁle of total ﬁnal wealth
given everything else as equal. First, it has an impact on the direct tax-eﬀect whose sign is
depending on the absolute tax-burden of stocks and bonds. Second, due to the higher expected
pre-tax return on stocks the expected indirect tax-eﬀect increases. Third, if the pre- and the
after-tax returns of S and B are not negatively correlated, the volatility of total ﬁnal wealth
increases as both the direct and the indirect tax-eﬀect are subject to higher volatility. While
according to the ﬁrst and third eﬀect, bonds should be preferably located in the retirement
account, the second eﬀect suggests that stocks could be preferably held in the retirement account
as well.
However, the changes of the risk-return proﬁles of stocks and bonds when shifting them
from the TA to the RA suggest that bonds should still be the preferred asset to hold in the RA.
Shifting bonds from the TA to the RA increases their return. However, shifting stocks from the
TA to the RA does not only increase their expected return, but also its volatility. Moreover,
bonds usually come with a higher eﬀective tax-rate than stocks.
According to Equation (6) total ﬁnal wealth consists of two components: total ﬁnal wealth
the investor would have attained without the opportunity of investing into a retirement account
and a tax-gift that results from the tax exemption of proﬁts in these accounts. As the impact
of the tax-gift decreases with a decreasing investment horizon, its impact is stronger, the longer
the remaining investment horizon. Due to the fact that investors usually prefer bonds in their
retirement account, the properties of the tax-gift are more similar to those of bonds than
to those of stocks. The tax-gift can thus be regarded an implicit bond position that is not
directly observable in the investor’s security accounts. The higher the unobservable implicit
bond position, the higher the observable equity position. This is why for longer remaining
investment horizons investors will have a higher observable bond position than for shorter
12remaining investment horizons. Hence, besides decreasing future labor income, decreasing
unobservable bond holding in retirement accounts are another reason for decreasing equity
exposure over the life cycle.
Due to the risks associated with the indirect tax-eﬀect, the preference for bonds in the
retirement account, and the shadow price of one dollar in the retirement account, an investor
with a high fraction of his wealth in a retirement account will hold a lower total fraction of
stocks than an investor with a high fraction of his wealth in a taxable account.
4 Numerical Evidence
For the numerical analysis, a short-selling constrained investor who can invest in a market
with a risky asset S and a risk-free asset B is considered. The characteristics of S and B are
similar to those of stocks and bonds, respectively. The capital gains rate of S is lognormally
distributed with an expected gain of µg,S = 0.09 and a standard deviation of σg,S = 0.20. Asset
S has a constant dividend rate of dS = 0.02. Asset B has a certain interest-rate of dB = 0.06
and no capital gains. An investment horizon of T = 40 years is considered and the investor
is initially endowed with a retirement wealth of WR,0 = 5,000 dollars and a taxable wealth
of WT,0 = 5,000 dollars. The tax-rates on dividends and gains are τd = 0.36 and τg = 0.2,
respectively. This parameter choice follows Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004). For these
parameter values, the eﬀective tax-rates for stocks and bonds are τS = 0.16 and τB = 0.36,
respectively. Thus, investors that are not short-selling constrained in their taxable accounts
should hold their entire retirement wealth in bonds.
The investor is assumed to maximize his utility of total ﬁnal wealth Wt from a power-utility
function with a parameter of risk aversion of γ ∈ [0,∞)
U(Wt) :=

 
 
W
1−γ
t
1−γ for γ 6= 1
ln(Wt) for γ = 1.
(12)
13His optimization problem is
max
αT,αR
E[U [Wt]] (13)
s.t.
Wk = WR,k + WT,k (14)
WR,k+1 = WR,k (αR,k · RR,k) (15)
WT,k+1 = WT,k (αT,k · RT,k) (16)
0 ≤ αR,k,αT,k ≤ 1 (17)
in which αT := (αT,1,...,αT,t) and αR := (αR,1,...,αR,t). Normalizing by Wt and taking into
account that U is homogeneous in wealth implies that the optimization problem is equivalent
to the solution of
max
αT,αR
E

U

Wt
Wk

(18)
s.t.
1 =
WR,k
Wk
+
WT,k
Wk
(19)
WR,k+1
Wk
=
WR,k
Wk
(αR,k · RR,k) (20)
WT,k+1
Wk
=
WT,k
Wk
(αT,k · RT,k) (21)
0 ≤ αR,k,αT,k ≤ 1. (22)
If Vk(Xk) denotes the investor’s utility as a function of his states variables Xk at time k, it
holds for an investor with risk-aversion of γ 6= 1 that
Vk (Xk) := max
αT,αR
E

U

WR,k
Wk

(23)
= max
αT,αR
E
"
Vk+1 (Xk+1) ·

WR,k
Wk
(αR,k · RR,k) +

1 −
WR,k
Wk

(αT,k · RT,k)
1−γ#
.
(24)
The solution of this problem can thus be computed numerically using backward induction. For
the optimization procedure one state-variable (the percentage of wealth in the RA relative to
total wealth Xk =
WR,k
Wk at the end of period k) is suﬃcient. The grid is spanned with 101 grid
points that are equally distributed on [0,1].
14If the investor would only have the opportunity to invest into one account, he would hold
the same fraction of stocks in all periods according to the classical result of Merton (1969) and
Samuelson (1969). All derivations from a constant fraction of stocks thus have to be driven by
the diﬀerent taxable treatment of the assets in the two accounts.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 shows the optimal equity proportion for an investor with risk-aversion of γ = 3 as
a function of time passed since the initial investment and his fraction of retirement wealth to
total wealth. The upper left and the upper right graphs show his optimal fraction of stocks
in the TA and the RA, respectively. If his fraction of wealth in the retirement account is zero
or one, the investor is in the one-account world, there is no asset location decision, and in line
with Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) he holds the same fraction of stocks independent
from the remaining investment horizon. If, however, the investor is endowed with both taxable
and retirement wealth, he has to decide, which assets to hold in the retirement account and
which in the taxable account. Conﬁrming the ﬁndings of the recent literature on optimal asset
location, we ﬁnd the investor to prefer bonds in the retirement account and stocks in the taxable
account.
The lower right graph, which depicts the sum of the investor’s optimal fraction of stocks
in the TA and the RA, shows that the investor only holds stocks in the retirement account
if his taxable wealth is entirely invested in stocks. With an increasing fraction of wealth in
the retirement account, the investor ﬁrst increases his fraction of stocks in the TA until it has
attained 100% as can be seen from the upper left graph. However, increasing his fraction of
retirement wealth further, does not cause the investor to immediately increase his fraction of
stocks in the retirement account - as can be seen from the lower right graph. For small increases
in retirement wealth, he keeps his fraction of stocks in the retirement account at 0% (plateau
eﬀect), which reﬂects the fact that bonds are preferred in the RA as they come with a more
advantageous risk-return proﬁle in the retirement account. Furthermore, if only risk-free bonds
are held in the RA, there is no additional source of risk from the tax-eﬀect. The size of the
plateau eﬀect increases with a short-term investment horizon. This is due to the fact that for
short investment horizons the probability of facing a negative tax-eﬀect when being invested
into equities in the retirement account is signiﬁcantly higher than for long investment horizons.
If the fraction of retirement wealth increases even further, the investor increases the fraction
of stocks in the retirement account. This reﬂects his desire not to get too heavily invested into
15bonds. However, the increase in the fraction of stocks in the retirement account is slower than
in the taxable account. If the investor does not have any retirement wealth, his optimal equity
exposure is about 70%, if he does not have any taxable wealth his optimal equity exposure
is only about 50%. This is due to the fact that bonds have a more advantageous risk-return
proﬁle in the retirement account.
The investor’s fraction of stocks in both the taxable account and the retirement account
decreases with decreasing length of the remaining investment horizon. This is due to the
fact that with decreasing investment horizon, the expected tax-gift decreases. As the investor
prefers bonds in the retirement account for lower levels of retirement wealth, the tax-gift can
be considered a certain income stream which is similar to a risk-free bond. If the investor has
a higher retirement wealth, the tax-gift is still more similar to a risk-free bond than to a stock
as the investor’s fraction of stocks in the RA remains below 50%, despite the associated risk.
This does not necessarily hold for investors with even lower risk-aversion which is why in that
case the tax-gift can become more similar to an implicit stock-holding. Due to the absence of
this implicit bond holding, the investor increases his explicit bond holding and thus decreases
his equity exposure for short investment horizons.
The lower left graph depicts the fraction of stocks relative to total wealth. For low levels
of retirement wealth, the stock fraction is more prevalent. This is due to shartp increases in
equity exposure in the taxable account. This is explained by the fact that one dollar of bonds in
the retirement account has a higher impact on total ﬁnal wealth than one dollar in the taxable
account due to the tax-eﬀect. In particular, the indirect tax-eﬀect has a tremendous impact for
long investment horizons. As the tax-eﬀect diminishes with decreasing investment horizon, the
increase in the total fraction of stocks decreases with increasing time passed since the initial
investment.
For higher levels of retirement wealth, the total fraction of stocks ﬁrst rapidly decreases
due to the plateau eﬀect and the investor’s aversion against holding stocks in the retirement
account. For even higher levels of retirement wealth, the total fraction of stocks decreases even
further, a ﬁnding noted by Dammon, Spatt, and Zhang (2004). Consequently, one dollar of
stocks in the retirement account has a higher impact on total ﬁnal wealth than one dollar of
stocks in the taxable account. However, the slope of the decrease is somewhat lower as the
investor starts holding stocks in his retirement account. Nevertheless, as bonds come with a
more advantageous risk-proﬁle in the retirement account, this increase is not strong enough to
16prevent the total fraction of stocks from decreasing as retirement wealth increases.
Figure 2 about here
Figure 2 shows the total fraction of stocks for investors with risk-aversion of γ = 2, γ = 5,
γ = 7 and γ = 10. It shows that even though the absolute level of equity exposure changes
with risk-aversion the patterns observable for the case of an investor with risk-aversion of γ = 3
remain valid. However, the peak where the investor holds the maximum total fraction of
stocks increases in retirement wealth with increasing γ and decreases in retirement wealth with
decreasing γ. This is due to the fact that for higher levels of risk-aversion the investor tends
to hold fewer stocks, and thus deserves a higher fraction of wealth in the retirement account,
until he ends up with 100% of stocks in his taxable account. Alternatively, for lower levels of
risk-aversion he holds more stocks and thus holds 100% of stocks in his taxable account for
quite low levels of retirement wealth already.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the ﬁeld of asset location decisions for retirement savers having the opportunity
to invest into both a retirement account and a taxable account is outlined.
Conﬁrming recent ﬁndings in economic literature that bonds are the preferred asset to hold
in the retirement account, we show that the investor only holds stocks in the RA if his taxable
wealth is entirely invested into equity. We further show that the investor does not increase his
equity exposure in the retirement account immediately with increasing retirement wealth, but
prefers to hold only bonds in his retirement account for small increases in retirement wealth
which is another indication for his preference for bonds in the retirement account. If, however,
the investor’s retirement wealth is substantial, he also holds some stocks in his retirement
account in order to prevent from investing too heavily in bonds.
While the literature on optimal asset location concludes in (almost) one voice that bonds
are the preferred asset to hold in retirement accounts, this paper focuses on the relation of asset
location and asset allocation and shows that besides the locational preference, the opportunity
to invest in a retirement account also has an impact on asset allocation. It is argued that the
diﬀerent taxable treatment of capital gains and dividends in taxable as well as tax-sheltered
retirement accounts has an impact on asset allocation. Compared to the benchmark of a
constant equity proportion in a one-account problem, the investor’s equity proportion depends
17on both his fraction of total wealth in the retirement account and the length of the remaining
investment horizon. The longer the remaining investment horizon, the higher the investor’s
equity exposure in both taxable and retirement account. This ﬁnding is due to the fact that
total ﬁnal wealth can be decomposed into what the investor would have attained in the absence
of a tax-deferred investment vehicle and a tax-gift resulting from the tax exemption of proﬁts
in retirement accounts. As the properties of the tax-gift are more similar to those of risk-free
bonds than to those of stocks and its impact is decreasing with decreasing remaining investment
horizon, the investor is endowed with some implicit bond holding that is unobservable in his
security account. As the impact of the tax-gift on total ﬁnal wealth is stronger the longer the
remaining investment horizon, the investor’s equity exposure is higher the longer the remaining
investment horizon.
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Figure 1: This Figure shows the optimal asset location and asset allocation strategy for an
investor with risk-aversion of γ = 3 as a function of his fraction of retirement wealth to total
wealth and the time passed since the initial investment. The upper left graph shows his optimal
fraction of stocks in the TA, the upper right graph depicts his optimal fraction of stocks in the
RA. The lower left graph shows the optimal overall equity exposure, the lower right graph
shows the sum of the optimal relative equity exposure in the TA and the RA.
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Figure 2: This Figure shows the optimal total equity exposure of investors with diﬀerent degrees
of risk-aversion as a function of their fraction of retirement wealth to total wealth and the time
passed since the initial investment.
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